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Abstract 
This paper examines whether comparative advantage is the long-run outcome of an 
evolutionary process in the open economy. It formalizes the notion that natural selection 
eliminates inefﬁcient ﬁrms and thus leads to stable and perhaps efﬁcient patterns of world 
trade. Instead of assuming the existence of a Walrasian auctioneer, we study two simple 
matching processes that coordinate trade between ﬁrms. Our central result is that 
specialization according to comparative advantage, with the larger country possibly 
incompletely specialized, is the unique evolutionarily stable state of the world economy. 
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The principle of survival of the ﬁttest can be regarded as a vast 
generalization of Ricardian economics 
John Maynard Keynes 2 
 1. Introduction 
There is a story that makes the rounds among international economists. As a 
young Fellow at Harvard, Paul Samuelson was challenged by one of his 
colleagues—who later became a renowned physicist—to state ‘‘one idea in 
economics that is true and not trivial’’. Samuelson immediately replied, ‘‘The 
concept of comparative advantage’’. Some might argue that comparative advan­
tage is to productive efﬁciency what the Pareto property is to distributive 
efﬁciency. Both are ineluctable elements of a price-taking equilibrium, and they 
serve to formalize the notion that the invisible hand tends to promote the social 
good. This paper asks the question: Does an analog of the invisible hand lead to 
production according to comparative advantage in an evolutionary model? Our 
simple conclusion is: Yes. 
Alchian (1950) is credited with the ﬁrst insight that economic phenomena could 
be modeled in an evolutionary framework. He argued intuitively that natural 
selection within markets shapes economic activity in the long run. The main 
contribution of our work is to formalize his insight in a model of international 
trade. We follow Ricardo (1817) and assume that countries face different constant 
opportunity costs. Instead of modeling ﬁrms as price takers, we consider two 
simple matching processes. A ﬁrm enjoys the gains from trade only if it is matched 
with one that has a different good, and the gains from trade are divided according 
to a simple trading convention. We ask whether the pattern of trade will converge 
to that predicted by comparative advantage. 
There are two approaches to studying comparative advantage in a Ricardian 
framework. The ﬁrst and usual one assumes a perfectly competitive world market 
in which domestic and foreign ﬁrms are price-takers. Building upon Gabszewicz 
and Vial (1972) and Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) have recently proposed a 
second approach where markets are imperfectly competitive and ﬁrms choose 
quantities strategically. They show that in a wide class of Ricardian economies, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is autarky. Hence, production according to comparative 
disadvantage can easily emerge. When the number of players in each country is 
sufﬁciently large, an equilibrium with trade is possible, but the no-trade outcome 
persists. Still, Cordella and Gabszewicz always maintain the assumption of a 
Walrasian auctioneer who clears world markets 3. 
A competitive equilibrium ensures that all mutually beneﬁcial trades actually do 
materialize. The mechanism studied by Cordella and Gabszewicz generates 
another extreme outcome, in which it is possible that no mutually beneﬁcial trade 
is realized. Perhaps a model that avoids these two extremes might better 
approximate a complex modern economy. International markets are not friction­
less, so some mutually beneﬁcial trades may not occur. And even casual 
3So do the noteworthy contributions of Fisher (1985) and Rufﬁn (2001), both of which are 
imperfectly competitive models with Ricardian frameworks. 
observation contradicts the prediction that no mutually beneﬁcial trade ever takes 
place4. This paper proposes an alternative approach, combining elements of 
perfect competition and strategic behavior in an evolutionary framework. We drop 
the ideal of a Walrasian auctioneer and assume instead that a simple matching 
process coordinates trade. If a producer is lucky enough to meet someone— 
domestic or foreign—who has produced a different good, then a mutually 
beneﬁcial trade occurs. 
Here are the details of the production and matching processes. Producers 
anywhere in the world can produce one of two goods. Before the match, a ﬁrm 
produces a good. If two matched ﬁrms have the same good, then there are no gains 
from trade and each ﬁrm consumes what it brought to the match. It is perhaps 
useful to think of this as a sterile meeting, since it captures the idea that a mutually 
beneﬁcial trade is not realized. Otherwise, there is a fertile meeting that may be 
viewed as a temporary bilateral monopoly. The division of the gains from trade 
then depends on the bargaining powers of the two ﬁrms, and we assume that they 
share the social surplus equally 5. This rule corresponds to the Nash bargaining 
solution, since the threat point of either agent is to consume his own output, 
yielding a utility level of zero for our speciﬁcation of preferences. 
We study two matching processes: one where a ﬁrm can meet anyone and 
another where a ﬁrm automatically meets a foreign counterpart. The ﬁrst 
mechanism is general in that it allows both international and intra-national 
matches, with the probability of each type of match being determined by the 
relative sizes of the countries. Using the assumption of identical Cobb–Douglas 
preferences, we show that the unique Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily stable and 
that production follows comparative advantage. A small country specializes in the 
good in which it has a comparative advantage, and a large country is incompletely 
specialized. Our analysis suggests that the assumption of ‘‘sufﬁcient competitive 
forces’’ (Cordella and Gabszewicz, 1997, p. 346) is not necessary for the world 
economy to display convergence to an equilibrium where production follows 
comparative advantage. Moreover, in an evolutionary framework, we make no 
explicit assumptions about rationality, perfect information, or common knowledge. 
Thus production according to comparative advantage is a deep outcome, even in a 
matching model with explicit frictions that prevent market forces from working 
their ineluctable magic. 
It is natural to ask whether one can rationalize within our model the kind of 
no-trade equilibrium that Cordella and Gabszewicz highlighted. Surprisingly, one 
4The empirical evidence on the Ricardian hypothesis suggests that the truth lies between these 
extremes. For instance, Golub and Hsieh (2000) ﬁnd that a large proportion of the sectoral variation of 
trade remains unexplained, although labor productivity differences have the correct sign and are 
statistically signiﬁcant. 
5Allowing for different bargaining powers or even using the Walrasian allocations does not change 
our qualitative results. 
 can. Our second matching process imposes that only international matches can 
occur. In this case, the world economy has two Nash equilibria, both of which are 
evolutionarily stable. One corresponds to complete specialization according to 
comparative advantage, while the other entails the opposite pattern. In Cordella 
and Gabszewicz, the ‘‘bad equilibrium’’ arises because the representative agent 
has extreme preferences, deriving utility largely from the good in which it has 
comparative disadvantage. In our model, home and foreign ﬁrms have identical 
preferences and both goods are desirable. However, in our second matching 
process, the ‘‘bad’’ outcome arises because foreigners are increasingly specialized 
in the ‘‘wrong’’ good. No ﬁrm producing the ‘‘right’’ good will get a high payoff 
because it has only a small chance of entering into a fertile match with its foreign 
counterpart. Thus being locked into the wrong pattern of production can be 
mutually reinforcing, if there is a strong restriction in the matching process. 
Since the evolutionary model is dynamic, it is possible to identify initial 
conditions under which the world economy will converge to the ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ 
equilibrium. In particular, we show that if the initial conditions correspond to the 
evolutionarily stable strategy for two hitherto closed economies, then the world 
economy converges monotonically to the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium. Following Foster 
and Young (1990), we also examine the consequences of small random shocks to 
the pattern of production in each economy. Imposing an explicit process for 
random mutations and using simulations, we show that the equilibrium with 
comparative advantage is stochastically stable. Thus, even if the world economy is 
stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium, in the very long run, the random mutations will 
allow it to escape to the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium with comparative advantage. 
Specialization according to comparative advantage turns out to be a robust 
prediction of the evolutionary models we examine. We note in passing that this 
result has implications beyond the arena of international trade. In particular, the 
vast literature on search and matching has also studied deviations from frictionless 
Arrow–Debreu economies. Two seminal papers are Diamond (1982) and Kiyotaki 
and Wright (1989). Their common point of departure is the assumption that agents 
cannot consume their own goods, and therefore, need to trade. This postulate 
reﬂects the ‘‘advantage of specialized production and trade over self-sufﬁciency’’ 
(Diamond, 1982, p. 883). Diamond examines the implications of this idea for a 
theory of unemployment, whilst Kiyotaki and Wright use it to develop a theory of 
money. One can view our results as a theoretical underpinning for this crucial and 
widespread assumption. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the concepts and methods of evolutionary game theory that are used 
in this paper. In the third section we sketch the model for the closed economy and 
describe static and dynamic aspects of its equilibrium. The fourth section studies 
the open economy model with both international and intra-national matches. The 
ﬁfth section studies the open economy under the restricted matching mechanism 
and shows that multiple equilibria are possible. The sixth section imposes a 
 speciﬁc process for random mutations and discusses properties of the stochastical­
ly stable set; several illuminating simulations are analyzed. The seventh section 
presents some brief conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
2. A thumbnail sketch of evolutionary game theory for the international 
economist 
Applying evolutionary game theory to comparative advantage is a surprisingly 
open area of research. Thus there is very little literature upon which we build 
directly. The only application of evolutionary game theory in international 
economics is by Friedman and Fung (1996), but they study the organization of 
ﬁrms, not the evolution of comparative advantage. On the other hand, there is a 
vast literature on international trade under less than perfect competition. 
The literature on evolutionary game theory has grown rapidly in the last decade. 
An important early article is by Friedman (1991, 1998) summarizes the same ideas 
in a technically less demanding fashion. There are now three excellent books 
summarizing this body of research: Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997) and 
Vega-Redondo (1996). Using dynamics that stress imitation and mutation, Vega­
Redondo (1997) studies the evolution of price-taking behavior in partial equilib­
rium. He uses a model with ﬁnitely many ﬁrms producing a homogenous good. 
Such an analysis is of limited interest for international economists because there is 
no reason for trade. 
The fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory is the notion of an 
evolutionarily stable strategy. Consider a large population of identical agents. A 
biologist would call this a monomorphic population, and an international econom­
ist might think of this as a closed economy. These agents meet often in random 
pair-wise matches. Each agent is completely described by its list of behaviors 
(pure strategies) and by a function describing the ﬁtness (payoff) that arises when 
any one behavior meets another. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a symmetric 
equilibrium that satisﬁes two properties. First, each strategy must be a best 
response to itself. Second, if a sufﬁciently small fraction of the population adopts 
another strategy, then agents who stick with the original one should earn a higher 
payoff than those who decided to switch. Thus a strict Nash equilibrium is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy because it is a best response to itself and to other 
mixed strategies that are close enough to it. If the equilibrium is a mixture of 
several pure strategies, then there are several best responses to it 6. Now one has to 
check the second condition; this property is summarized by the idea that the 
6Nash himself ﬁrst proposed the idea that a mixed strategy could be thought of as a distribution of 
genes, but the formal deﬁnition of an evolutionarily stable strategy was not proposed until two decades 
later. 
original (equilibrium) strategy has a higher degree of ﬁtness against the mutants 
than the mutants have against themselves. 
For an international economist, a model of a monomorphic population is less 
than half the picture. Now consider a bimorphic population, one with two types of 
agents; a moment’s reﬂection shows that the genetic characteristics of foxes will 
certainly inﬂuence natural selection in the population of rabbits (and vice versa). 
The study of bimorphic populations is natural for an international economist, since 
the characteristics of foreign ﬁrms inﬂuence the proﬁtability of domestic produc­
ers. Now the deﬁnition of an evolutionarily stable strategy is not so straight­
forward. We follow the usual convention and analyze Nash equilibria that are 
resistant to invasion by a small share of mutants within one population at a time. 
Thus a rabbit gene that ‘‘causes’’ fast running is an evolutionarily stable strategy if 
a sufﬁciently small share of mutant slow bunnies does not fare well against the 
current population of foxes. 
In our evolutionary model, there are two behaviors in the population of 
domestic ﬁrms: producing the ﬁrst or second good. We show that the matching 
process in the closed economy gives rise to a Hawk–Dove game. A population full 
of hawks—ﬁrms with a predisposition for producing the ﬁrst good—is not going 
to have a high level of average ﬁtness. Likewise, a population full of doves—ﬁrms 
producing only the second good—will run into similar difﬁculties. As we shall see 
below, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy for the closed economy consists of 
a mix of hawks and doves. If preferences satisfy some simple properties and the 
gains from trade are divided according Nash bargaining, then this mix induces 
exactly the shares of ﬁrms in each sector that maximizes expected social surplus. 
Thus our matching process has some attractive properties for the closed economy. 
When an economy opens for international trade, something different occurs. 
Now the world economy consists literally of two different species: homeboys and 
foreign animals. Homeboys and foreign animals face different technological 
tradeoffs. At ﬁrst, both homeboys and foreign animals have distributions of 
behaviors, with some producing the ﬁrst good and others the second. Fitness is 
determined by a continual series of matches between animals on the world stage 7. 
In our general model, homeboys can meet anyone, including their own ilk. In this 
model, comparative advantage arises naturally, and it is the unique evolutionarily 
stable state. In the restricted model, homeboys can only meet foreign animals. 
Now there are two evolutionarily stable strategies: one in which all the homeboys 
produce the ﬁrst good and all the foreign animals produce the second good and the 
other with the opposite pattern of trade. 
Why does the situation with restricted matches give rise to such a different 
outcome? Selten (1980) has the right intuition; since homeboys always meet 
foreign animals, no distribution of behaviors on the interior of the simplex is 
7We hope that our admittedly colorful language does not distract the reader unduly. It does give a 
new meaning to the term ‘‘international competitiveness’’. 
stable. If two strategies have the same payoffs, then nothing punishes genetic drift. 
On the other hand, in the general model, if a small share of mutants enters the 
world economy, the corresponding behavior will meet itself with strictly positive 
probability and the expected ﬁtness of the entrants drops. Thus the original 
distribution of strategies following comparative advantage is stable. 
A big advantage of evolutionary game theory is that there is a natural link with 
a dynamical system whose state is the distribution of strategies in the population. 
There are different rules for describing the dynamics of the system, but the most 
common is perhaps the replicator dynamic. This rule states that a strategy’s 
relative share in the population increases in proportion to how much its ﬁtness 
exceeds the average level of ﬁtness. It is perhaps the simplest way to capture 
Darwin’s deep insight. While the assumption of replicator dynamics is natural for 
biological models, it requires some justiﬁcation in an economic model. There are 
at least four reasons for choosing this rule. First, it is computationally simple and 
easy to exposit. Second, it allows for some inertia in the model because the 
distribution of strategies changes gradually rather than abruptly (Friedman, 1998). 
Third, if imitation is the economic analog of genetic transmission and an important 
component of how agents learn, then the replicator dynamics is likely to provide a 
good approximation to the process of strategy selection (Samuelson, 1997, p. 63). 
Finally, under the replicator dynamics, an evolutionarily stable strategy is also an 
evolutionary equilibrium, in the sense that no small-scale invasion by equilibrium 
entrants can push the world economy away from this pattern of production. 
We do not explicitly model the learning behavior of ﬁrms, but simply note that a 
variety of imitation-driven models give rise to the dynamics assumed here, at least 
approximately. For instance, suppose that ﬁrms are inﬁnitely lived and boundedly 
rational. After each period, a ﬁrm reviews its strategy by sampling another ﬁrm at 
random. The reviewing ﬁrm observes its payoff and that of the sampled ﬁrm with 
some noise. If the observed difference is positive, the reviewing ﬁrm switches to 
the sampled ﬁrm’s strategy; otherwise it continues with the old strategy. If the 
noise process is uniformly distributed, the imitation dynamics of this model are 
simply a rescaling of the replicator dynamics by a positive constant 8. Given that 
there is no consensus yet on the most reasonable general approach to modeling 
learning by economic agents, using the replicator dynamics seems appropriate for 
our purposes. We study some dynamic properties of the closed and open 
economies at several points in the analysis below. 
Imposing an explicit process for random mutations and using simulations, we 
show that the equilibrium with comparative advantage is stochastically stable. An 
8For more general noise processes, the imitative dynamics are payoff-monotonic and have the same 
set of stationary states as the replicator dynamics. Moreover, in the neighborhood of a stationary state, a 
linear approximation yields the replicator dynamics rescaled by a positive constant. See Weibull (1995) 
(pp. 157–158) for details and other examples of models that yield dynamics similar to the replicator 
dynamics. 
 equilibrium of a biological system—thought of as a population state—is stochas­
tically stable if, as the probability of mutations becomes asymptotically small, the 
population spends almost all its time in a neighborhood of this state. Thus, even if 
the world economy is initially stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium, in the (very) long 
run, random mutations will allow it to escape. When there is strong comparative 
advantage, the expected waiting time for the ‘‘right’’ equilibrium will be short 
enough, but for plausible calibrations with fairly large mutations, it may take ﬁve 
centuries of monthly trading for the right conﬁguration of mutations to arise! 
3. The model in a closed economy 
The closed economy consists of a continuum of identical agents. Each agent is 
both a consumer and producer. There are two commodities in the world economy, 
and the representative agent’s preferences are summarized by the log-linear utility 
2 a 12afunction u: R → R whose rule is u(x) 5 (x ) (x ) . Each agent is endowed 1 1 2 
with one unit of time, and the production process is indivisible, so that an agent 
can produce either good 1 or good 2, but not both. Thus each agent has the 
T T 2 Tproduction set Y 5 h(1 /a , 0)  , (0, 1 /a ) j, R where a 5 (a , a ) is the vector 1 2 1 1 2 
of labor coefﬁcients. Since this set is not convex, each agent is forced to trade if it 
wants a mix of the two goods. In each period, an agent produces one of the goods 
without knowing what the rest of the population has chosen. Even though each 
agent’s production set is not convex, the production possibility frontier for the 
entire economy is. In essence, nature can choose any fraction of a large population 
of agents to produce either good, and she faces the typical constant opportunity 
cost that characterizes the essence of a Ricardian technology 9. When a random 
match occurs, the surplus is split according to simple Nash bargaining. Let 
 u (1 /2)u(1 /a , 1 /a ); we can now summarize this aspect of the model succinctly. h 1 2 
Assumption 1. The (row player’s) payoffs in the closed economy are 
0 uh A 5 .F Guh 0 
The upper left element is the row player’s payoff if he produces the ﬁrst good and 
has a sterile match; the upper right element is his payoff if he meets a column 
player who has produced the second good and thus has a fertile match. The 
payoffs correspond to Nash bargaining solution in each of the four possible 
9Alternatively, one can also view each individual agent as ‘‘choosing’’ a possibly mixed strategy 
 r5(r , 12r ), 0#r #1, where r is the probability of producing the ﬁrst good. Allowing for mixed 1 1 1 1 
strategies renders each agent’s strategy choice set convex, and aggregating over all agents and 
appealing to the law of large numbers results in the usual linear Ricardian production possibilities 
frontier for the economy. 
outcomes. It is obvious that a population of agents producing only the ﬁrst good 
will not fare well. Random matching introduces an explicit friction into this 
economy, and an important element of the theoretical analysis is to show that 
pattern of trade largely follows comparative advantage in spite of this strong 
trading imperfection. 
Let D5hs[R2 us 1s 51j be the relevant simplex. The state of the system is 1 1 2 
an element s[D describing the distribution of the population producing each 
good. A strategy for a home or foreign ﬁrm is a vector r5(r1, r2)T [D with the 
interpretation that the ﬁrm produces good 1 with probability r1 and good 2 with 
probability r . Then the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm that plays strategy r5(r , r )T when the 2 1 2 
T
state is s[D is f(r, s)5r As. Some simple algebra shows that 
f(r, s) 5 (r s  1 r s  )u1 2  2 1 h  
We can now state our ﬁrst result. 
Proposition 3.1. The model in the closed economy is a Hawk–Dove game. Its 
unique evolutionarily stable strategy is sˆ5(1 /2,  1 /2)  T. Moreover, this strategy 
maximizes social surplus, given the matching technology. 
Proof. The model is a Hawk–Dove game because the diagonal elements of the 
payoff matrix are zero and its off-diagonal elements are positive. Since the best 
response to state s[D is r5(1, 0) T if s2 .1/2 and r5(0, 1) T if s1 .1/2, it is easy 
to see that the unique Nash equilibrium is sˆ5(1 /2, 1 /2) T. Since this is not a strict 
Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for any r±sˆ there exists ´.0 such that 
f(sˆ, s ).f(r, s ), where s 5(12´)sˆ1´r. The ﬁtness of the original population is ´ ´ ´ 
f(sˆ, s )5(12´)u /21´(r 1r )u /2 and that of the mutants is ´ h 1 2 h 
(1 2´)(r 1 r )u1 2 h f(r, s ) 5]]]]]1 ´ (r r  1 r r  )u .´ 1 2  2 1 h2 
Since r1 1r2 51, 
1 1 T T 1 fS D] ], , s ) 2 f((r , r ) ,  s )) 5´S]2 2r r  Du . 0.´ 1 2 ´ 1 2  h2 2  2  
This inequality is true because (1 /222r r  )$0, with equality only if 1 /25r 51 2  1  
r . Hence, for any ´.0, f(sˆ, s ).f(r, s ) and the population state sˆ5(1 /2,  1 /2)  T 2 ´ ´ 
is an evolutionarily stable strategy. 
The strategy sˆ5(1 /2, 1 /2) T maximizes expected social surplus because it 
maximizes the chance of fertile matches. h 
ˆ ˆ  hThe ﬁtness of the population of domestic ﬁrms is f(s, s )5u /2. If each ﬁrm 
could be assured of meeting an appropriate counterpart with the opposite good, 
then the average welfare of the population would be uh. But half that surplus is 
 lost because the random matching process cannot guarantee that every match is 
fertile. Still, it is noteworthy that the ‘‘correct’’ shares of ﬁrms go into the each 
industry. These shares are correct since the Nash bargaining rule splits the surplus 
from a fertile match equally. 
Now let z[D be any arbitrary population state, with the usual interpretation that 
the fraction 0#zi #1 of the population is of the i-th type. The replicator dynamics 
are described by 
i Tz~ i 5 (e 2 z) (Az)zi, 
where ei is the vector with unity in the i-th position and zero elsewhere. Some 
simple calculations show that z~ 5(122z )z z u  and z~ 5 2 z~ . Convergence to 1 1 1 2 h 2 1 
the evolutionarily stable strategy is quick if the average level of productivity is 
high. 
4. A general matching model for the open economy 
This section extends the model to allow for international matches. Now trade 
can take place both within an economy and between economies, since a home ﬁrm 
can be matched with any ﬁrm in the world. Let m denote the relative size of the 
home country and 12m that of foreign country. Firms in this world population are 
randomly matched, so for any ﬁrm—home or foreign—the probability of being 
matched with a home ﬁrm is simply m. We summarize the matching process: 
Assumption 2. The probability of meeting a domestic (foreign) ﬁrm is equal to the 
share of domestic (foreign) ﬁrms in the world population. 
Now consider the open economy modeled as a bimorphic population of home 
and foreign ﬁrms. In order to keep the equilibrium as simple as possible, we 
assume that both countries have identical preferences again represented by u(x)5 
a 12a(x ) (x ) . The production set for the foreign country is given by Y*5h(1 /a*,1 2 1
 
T T T
0) , (0, 1 /a*) j where a*5(a*, a*) is the vector of labor coefﬁcients for the 2 1 2 
foreign country. With only slight loss of generality, we assume that a /a*,a /a*,1 1 2 2 
namely that the home country has strict comparative advantage in good 1. 
In the event that a home ﬁrm is matched with another home ﬁrm, the same 
matrix A describes its payoffs. Let u 5(1 /2)u(1 /a*, 1 /a*). The following is the f 1 2 
analog of Assumption 1. 
Assumption 1*. The foreign (row player’s) payoffs for intra-national foreign 
matches are 
0 uf A* 5 .F Guf 0 
Consider any ﬁrm that has been matched with a counterpart from abroad, and let 
u¯5(1 /2)u(1 /a , 1 /a*) and u¯5(1 /2)u(1 /a*, 1 /a ). Note that the assumption of 1 2 1 2 
¯ ¯identical Cobb–Douglas preferences implies that u u  5uu, a fact that will be very h f  
useful in the proofs below. We summarize our assumptions for international 
matches: 
Assumption 3. The domestic (row player’s) payoffs in an international match are 
0 u¯ B 5F G.u 0
] 
Also, u¯ .u, and u u  5uu¯ ¯  .
] h f  
The diagonal elements of B correspond to the payoffs from the sterile 
encounters. In a fertile encounter, we assume again that the resulting social surplus 
is divided equally. The element u¯ is the payoff when a match follows production 
according to comparative advantage, and u is the payoff for the opposite
]
conﬁguration of goods. Since preferences and the simple rule for dividing the 
gains from trade might confound comparative advantage we postulate further that 
u¯ .u. A sufﬁcient condition is a$1/2 10. Since there is no price mechanism 
] 
* *  
guiding production in this model, it is important that a fertile match according to 
comparative advantage have a relatively high payoff. 
These matrices enable us to deﬁne the ﬁtness functions for the representative 
agent in the home or foreign country. Recall that D is the one-dimensional 
simplex; now the state space S5D3D gives a complete description of the 
population shares of domestic and foreign ﬁrms producing the two different goods. 
A generic element is s5(z, z*)[S, where z5(z1, z2)T is the vector of population 
shares of home ﬁrms in the two sectors and z*5(z1 , z2 )T is analogous for the 
shares of foreign ﬁrms. 
TThe ﬁtness of a domestic ﬁrm that plays strategy r5(r1, r2) , when the state is 
T T
s[S, is  f(r, s)5mr Az1(12m)r Bz*. Some simple algebra shows that 
1 (1 2m)z u  ]r *f(r, s) 5 [mz u  * ¯ 1 [mz u  1 (1 2m)z u]r . (1)2 h  2 1 1 h  1 2] 
The expression in the ﬁrst square bracket in (1) is the expected payoff from 
producing good 1 and meeting either a home ﬁrm or a foreign ﬁrm and then 
having a fertile match, and that in the second square bracket is the expected payoff 
from producing good 2. It is now easy to see that the ﬁtness of a foreign ﬁrm is 
T T  Tf *(r, s)5mr B z1(12m)r A*z*, or 
f *(r, s) 5 [mz u  1 (1 2m)z u  ]r ** 1 [mz u¯ 1 (1 2m)z u  ]r . (1*) 2 2 f 1 1 1 f 2] 
Eq. (1*) is of course exactly analogous to (1). 
10The exact condition is a$ln(a* /a ) / hln(a* /a )1ln(a* /a )j. Since the home country has2 2 1 1 2 2 
comparative advantage in the ﬁrst good, the right side of this inequality is not greater than 1 /2. 
A state s5(z, z*)[S is a Nash equilibrium for the evolutionary game deﬁned 
by the ﬁtness functions f(., .) and f *(., .) if f(z, s)$f(r, s) and f *(z*, s)$f *(r, s) for 
all r[D. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium s5(z, z*)[S 
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed. First, for domestic ﬁrms it 
must be the case that: either (i) f(z, s).f(r, s) for all r±z[D; or (ii) if  f(z; s)5f(r; 
s) for some r[D, then there exists ´.0 such that f(z, s ).f(r, s ), where ´ ´ 
s 5(12´)s1´(r, z*). Second, for foreign ﬁrms it must be true that: either (i) ´ 
f *(z*, s).f *(r, s) for all r±z*[D; or (ii) if  f *(z*, s)5f *(r, s) for some r[D, 
then there exists ´.0 such that f *(z*, s ).f *(r, s ), where now s 5(12´)s1´(z,´ ´ ´ 
r).
 
We can now begin the description of the evolutionarily stable strategies. Notice
 
T T T Tﬁrst that neither ((1, 0) , (1, 0) )[S nor ((0, 1) , (0, 1) )[S is a Nash 
equilibrium, since it would never be optimal to enter into a sterile match with 
certainty. Could it be a Nash equilibrium to produce according to comparative 
disadvantage? We will demonstrate in four steps that this cannot happen. First, we 
will show that it is not a Nash equilibrium for both countries to specialize 
according to comparative disadvantage. Second, we will demonstrate that it is not 
a Nash equilibrium for either country to specialize according to comparative 
disadvantage, even if its trading partner is incompletely specialized. Third, we will 
show that it is not a Nash equilibrium for both countries to be incompletely 
specialized. Finally, we will show that specialization according to comparative 
advantage is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. 
Proposition 4.1. Complete specialization according to comparative disadvantage 
is not an equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix A. h 
The intuition behind Proposition 4.1 is that producing according to complete 
comparative disadvantage is so unﬁt that either a home ﬁrm or a foreign ﬁrm (or 
both) would ﬁnd it preferable to switch to the sector in which it has a comparative 
advantage, even if it only has fertile matches with ﬁrms in its own country. 
We still need to check whether one country can specialize in the good in which 
it has a comparative disadvantage while the other country is incompletely 
specialized. We now state. 
Proposition 4.2. No Nash equilibrium is such that a country is completely 
specialized in the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage. 
Proof. See Appendix A. h 
The intuition behind Proposition 4.2 is that specializing according to comparative 
disadvantage gives such a low level of ﬁtness that switching goods is an
 
improvement, even if one only meets a few foreign ﬁrms.
 
Since an evolutionarily stable strategy is necessarily a Nash equilibrium, the
 
following obtains.
 
Corollary 4.3. The pattern of production in which both countries follow 
 comparative disadvantage is not an evolutionarily stable strategy. 
The following narrows the set of equilibria further. 
Proposition 4.4. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both countries are 
 incompletely specialized. 
Proof. See Appendix A. h 
We still have to show that a Nash equilibrium in which production follows 
comparative advantage is indeed evolutionarily stable. We do this by assuming that 
the ﬁrms’ choices are best responses and checking whether they satisfy the extra 
condition that characterizes evolutionary stability. 
Proposition 4.5. The pattern of production according to comparative advantage is 
 evolutionarily stable. 
Proof. See Appendix A. h 
We can now state the central contribution of our research 
Theorem 4.6. Under Assumptions 1, 1*, 2 and 3, the evolutionarily stable 
 strategies are unique. If the relative size parameter m , uf /(uf 1 u¯ ), then the home 
 country is completely specialized according to comparative advantage and the 
 foreign country is incompletely specialized. If u /(u 1 u¯ ) #m # u¯ /(u 1 u¯ ), thenf f h 
 both countries are completely specialized according to comparative advantage. If 
u¯ /(uh 1u¯ ),m, the foreign country is completely specialized according to com­
 parative advantage and the home country is incompletely specialized. 
Proof. If the foreign country is incompletely specialized, then a foreign ﬁrm must 
* 2 fbe indifferent between entering the ﬁrst or second sector. Hence, (12m)z u  5 
 mu¯ 1(12m)z u* . It is easy to check that the solution to this equation has 1 f 
0,z* ,1/2 if and only if 0,m ,u /(u 1u¯ ). If this condition is true, then 1 f f 
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 show that the home country must be specialized in the 
ﬁrst sector. 
If the home country is incompletely specialized, then a home ﬁrm must be 
indifferent between entering the ﬁrst or second sector. Hence, (12m)u¯ 1mz u2 h  5 
mz u  . The solution to this equation has 1 /2,z ,1 if and only if u¯ /(u 1u¯ ),1 h  1 h  
m,1. If this condition is true, then Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 show that the foreign 
country must be completely specialized in the second sector. 
In both these cases, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium follows from the 
linearity of the ﬁtness functions f(., .) and  f *(., .) in the state variables z and z*. If 
the home country is completely specialized, there is a unique distribution of ﬁrms 
that makes a foreign ﬁrm indifferent between producing the two goods. The same 
is true for the case when the foreign country is completely specialized. 
If u /(u 1u¯ )#m #u¯ /(u 1u¯ ), then neither country can be indifferent about f f h 
which good it produces and thus both countries must be completely specialized. 
Proposition 4.2 shows that both countries must be completely specialized 
according to comparative advantage. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is 
trivially implied here. 
In each case, the uniqueness of the evolutionarily stable strategy follows from 
the uniqueness of the corresponding Nash equilibrium. h 
This theorem is the main contribution of our work. It shows that production 
according to comparative advantage arises naturally in a matching model in which 
the agents exhibit little (if any) rationality. Our model is so simple that there is no 
role for prices. Thus we have had to assume a match according to comparative 
advantage yields higher utility than one according to comparative disadvantage, 
but Assumption 3 is more stringent than necessary. In particular, it will always be 
the case that a (perhaps asymmetric) social convention could arise in which both 
foreign and domestic agents could divide the surplus from producing according to 
comparative advantage in a way that was Pareto superior to producing according 
to comparative disadvantage. This is true even if the agents have different 
preferences that need not be homothetic. It is likely that (asymmetric) versions of 
all the propositions in this section would also be true. We conjecture that 
production according to comparative advantage will arise in a more general model, 
but have made enough simplifying assumptions in this section so that the social 
convention based upon Nash bargaining gives us Theorem 4.6. 
We also ought to make an important observation about the welfare effects of 
trade in this version of the model. Theorem 4.6 says nothing about the gains from 
trade; it is a description of the pattern of exports in a model with severe market 
frictions and a simple convention for dividing the gains inherent in a fertile match. 
It is easy to see that a country with a strong absolute advantage in both goods may 
well experience lower average utility from trade 11; after all, Assumption 3 does 
not impose that u¯ .uh or u¯ .uf, but only that u¯ .u. We do not feel that this ] 
11We thank Priya Ranjan, our discussant at the University of California at Santa Cruz’s New 
Methods in International Economics Workshop, for making this point so clearly. We conjecture that a 
more sophisticated convention for dividing the gains from trade would guarantee not only that trade 
followed comparative advantage but also that it did not lower average welfare for either country. 
 observation is a weakness of the model. Instead, it shows that even in a severely 
distorted world economy, the old magic of comparative advantage predicts the 
pattern of trade well. 
How will the distribution of ﬁrms in the world economy evolve? Let s5(z, 
z*)[D3D be the population state. Now the replicator dynamics for domestic 
ﬁrms in industry i are: 
i Tz~ i 5 [e 2 z] [mAz 1 (1 2m)Bz*]zi, 
where again ei is a vector with unity in the i-th position and zeros elsewhere. The 
analogous dynamic for foreign ﬁrms is: 
i T Tz~ * i 5 [e 2 z*] [mB z  1 (1 2m)A*z*]z* i . 
This coupled system of differential equations describes the dynamics of the world 
economy. 
Fig. 1 is worth a thousand words 12. The locus L h is the set of points in the state 
space such that the share of domestic ﬁrms in either industry is constant. Consider 
its leftmost point; the parameters are such that even if all the foreign ﬁrms are 
specialized in the ﬁrst (and thus wrong) sector and about 20% of the home ﬁrms 
are producing that good, then a domestic ﬁrm is indifferent between either activity. 
Points below this locus will be such that a home ﬁrm ﬁnds the ﬁrst activity 
relatively proﬁtable and the share of domestic ﬁrms in the ﬁrst (right) sector is 
increasing. The L h locus slopes down because now decreased foreign competition 
is offset by increased local competition. Likewise, the locus L f is the set of points 
Fig. 1. Complete specialization phase diagram. 
12 T TIn this case and all subsequent simulations, we set a5(1, 2) , a*5(2.5, 1) , m50.5, and a50.5. 
The home country has moderate comparative advantage in good 1, and preferences are well behaved. 
 such that the share of foreign ﬁrms in either industry is also constant. Points below 
this locus are such that the share of foreign ﬁrms in industry 1 is increasing since 
there is little international competition in this industry. Since the home country has 
comparative advantage in good 1, the L h locus is everywhere above L f; a ﬁrm in 
the home country can tolerate a higher fraction of foreign ﬁrms in industry one and 
still break even. 
Fig. 1 underscores two crucial features of the general matching model. First, 
while the upper left corner is an absorbing state, it is not stable. Only absorbing 
states on the lower or right edge of the state space are. Since the parameters have 
been chosen to correspond to complete specialization, the lower right corner in 
Fig. 1 is the unique evolutionary equilibrium in this general matching model. Of 
course, if the parameters allowed for incomplete specialization, then there would 
be an absorbing state on the lower edge or on the right edge of the state space 13. 
Second, the transitional dynamics need not be monotone. Indeed, it is possible to 
have initial conditions such that the share of ﬁrms in an industry is ﬁrst increasing 
and then decreasing as the system adjusts to its long-run equilibrium. 
5. A restricted matching model 
In this section we analyze a slightly different model in which only international 
matches occur. Such a model might make sense if there were an equal number of 
home and foreign ﬁrms and if one thought of international trade as a special kind 
of matching process that assured that pairs of ﬁrms from two different countries 
meet in a special location, perhaps called ‘‘an international trading post’’. 
Assumption 4. Every match is between a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm. 
Agents still have identical preferences represented by a Cobb–Douglas utility 
function. Also, we continue to assume without loss of generality that the home 
country has comparative advantage in the ﬁrst good. Still, there is one technicality 
about the production sets that the international economist must address. Until now, 
the population share determines a country’s size. In a Ricardian model size 
matters, so we would be remiss if we forced the countries to be of equal size just 
to accommodate our restricted matching mechanism. Hence we will continue to 
T
assume that the production set of a home ﬁrm is the doubleton Y5h(1 /a1, 0)  , (0,  
1 /a2)Tj, but we will modify the production set of the foreign ﬁrm to be 
13With these production and taste parameters, if m,0.38 then the foreign country is large, and if 
m.0.58 then the home country is large. If the foreign country is large, both loci intersect the right edge 
of the state space, and the equilibrium occurs at the bottom right point of L f since the marginal foreign 
ﬁrm is indifferent between the two activities. Analogous statements are true when the home country is 
large and the equilibrium is on the bottom edge of the state space at the bottom right point of L h. 
T TY*5h(L*/a* 1 , 0)  , (0,  L*/a* 2 ) j. Each home ﬁrm still has one unit of labor, but 
foreign ﬁrms are endowed with L* units. 
˜
a 12a a 12aLet u˜5(1 /a ) (L*/a*) and u˜5(L*/a*) (1 /a ) . We again assume that 1 2 1 2
˜u˜ . u˜, and this condition is satisﬁed automatically if producing according to 
comparative advantage generates greater social surplus and the foreign country is 
not too large 14. We can now summarize: 
Assumption 5. The domestic (row player’s) payoffs in an international match are 
F G˜˜ 0 u˜B 5 .
u˜ 0
 
˜
Also, u˜ . u˜. 
T 
˜The domestic and foreign ﬁtness functions are now f(r, s)5r Bz* and f *(r, 
T 
˜
T 
s)5r B z, respectively. Eqs. (2) and (2*) give the relevant ﬁtness functions in 
this case. 
˜f(r, s) 5 r uz  ˜ * 1 r uz  ˜ * (2)1 2 2 1 
and 
˜
˜ 1 r uz  ˜ . (2*) f *(r, s) 5 r uz  1 2 2 1 
Proposition 5.1. Impose Assumptions 4 and 5. Then there are two evolutionarily 
stable strategies, one with production according to comparative advantage and 
another with production according to comparative disadvantage. 
Proof. See Appendix A. h 
The intuition is that the restricted matching process can lock ﬁrms into the wrong
 
pattern of production because mutants will never meet anyone with whom to
 
trade15.
 
Now the replicator dynamics for domestic ﬁrms in industry i are:
 
i T 
˜z~ i 5 (e 2 z) (Bz*)zi, 
and that for foreign ﬁrms is: 
i T 
˜
T 
z~ * i 5 (e 2 z*) (B z)z* i . 
14 
¯ ¯The exact condition is ln(u /u ).(2a21)ln L*. Thus Assumption 5 is a bit more stringent than 
Assumption 3 since it puts a restriction on the size of the foreign country. 
15An anonymous referee made the interesting observation that even the ‘‘wrong’’ assignment in this 
version of the model may well represent an increase in the average utility of both countries. These 
gains from trade are ‘‘non-Ricardian’’, and exist because trade leads to a greater division of labor 
within in each country so that in the evolutionarily stable state all sterile matches are eliminated. 
In this case, the state space S5D3D can be divided into four quadrants. The
˜  ˜ ˜  
ˆ ˜ ˜ ˜  ˆ ˜ ˜ ˜  ˆunstable Nash equilibrium has z 5 u /(u 1 u ) and z * 5 u /(u 1 u ). If z*.z *,1 1 1 1 
then z~ 1 ,0 and the home country is being pushed away from producing according 
to comparative advantage. Likewise, if z ,zˆ , then z~ * .0 and the foreign country 1 1 1 
is also being pushed in the ‘‘wrong’’ direction. How likely is it that the world 
economy will get stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium? A natural starting point for 
T T the bimorphic population is s(0)5((1 /2, 1 /2) , (1 /2, 1 /2) ), when two closed 
economies in long-run equilibrium open for international trade. The world 
economy will exhibit monotonic convergence to the equilibrium with comparative 
advantage if zˆ1 , 1/2  , zˆ * 1 . Since production according to comparative advantage 
generates greater social surplus, this chain of strict inequalities is true. 
For an economist, it might be surprising that the equilibrium with comparative 
disadvantage is evolutionarily stable. Still, the essence of international trade is that 
there is an inherent difference between a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm. In a 
biological model, this fact connotes an ineluctable element of asymmetry, and the 
analysis of asymmetric conﬂicts is an ongoing area of research in evolutionary 
theory. Building on Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) and Maynard Smith (1982) 
himself coined the term the ‘‘Bourgeois Principle’’ in analyzing the bimorphic 
generalization of the Hawk–Dove game. Consider a situation in which a 
homeowner meets an intruder; Maynard Smith and Parker argue that the 
equilibrium in which the owner ﬁghts if the intruder ﬂees and the intruder ﬂees if 
the owner ﬁghts is the only ‘‘natural’’ evolutionarily stable strategy 16. This is the 
Bourgeois principle, and it corresponds to the idea that the natural asymmetries 
arising in international trade will ensure that the equilibrium with comparative 
advantage will be selected. 
This line of reasoning may be faulty in an economic environment. In a model 
with restricted bilateral matching, there is no guarantee that a sufﬁciently 
entrenched pattern of production will be displaced by foreign competition. Grafen 
(1987) ﬁrst made this point in a biological model; in an owner–intruder conﬂict, 
the intruder has nothing to lose if ﬂeeing confers no genetic advantage. Thus he 
may well ﬁght, and Grafen calls this phenomenon the ‘‘Desperado effect’’. In the 
model in this section, the equilibrium where both countries produce according to 
comparative disadvantage has this ﬂavor. There are myriad examples in economic 
geography where the location of industry is determined largely by historical 
happenstance, and political considerations often maintain a seemingly inefﬁcient 
pattern of international production. Using a model with exogenous probabilities of 
death, Eshel and Sansone (1995) show that that there are sound theoretical reasons 
for either equilibrium to arise in bimorphic populations in the Hawk–Dove game. 
16Davies (1978) describes the behavior of the speckled wood butterﬂy and shows that the ‘‘owner’’ 
of a sunny spot on the forest ﬂoor almost always wins conﬂicts with an otherwise identical intruder. 
Still, Maynard Smith (1982) (p. 96) describes the unusual case of the social spider Oecibus civitas that 
apparently abandons a refuge hole if challenged by an intruder. 
 More recently, Binmore and Samuelson (2001) show that in asymmetric games 
with perturbed payoffs, approximations of mixed equilibria can be evolutionarily 
stable, thus blurring the sharp distinction between symmetric and asymmetric 
games. 
6. Stochastic dynamics in the open economy 
In this section, we will apply Foster and Young’s (1990) techniques to analyze 
the stochastically stable equilibrium in the open economy. The analysis in Section 
5 is a slight disappointment because there are initial conditions such that the world 
economy will eventually become polarized according to comparative disadvantage. 
If the initial distribution of ﬁrms in one country is biased towards the wrong 
sector, then it can force its trading partner to produce the wrong good in turn, and 
this downward spiral of comparative disadvantage reinforces itself. The crux of the 
problem is that one country is locked into the wrong technique at an early stage of 
international trade. 
Of course, the evolution of the population of ﬁrms in a country is not really a 
deterministic system. Firms in senescent industries might be kept alive in part by 
rent seeking, and ﬁrms in growing industries may not immediately prosper because 
of idiosyncratic constraints in the labor or credit market. Also, an adverse 
terms-of-trade shock will simultaneously protect inefﬁcient import-competing 
ﬁrms while making it more difﬁcult for ﬁrms in a nascent exporting industry to 
prosper. Thus it is quite appropriate to posit a more general stochastic rule for the 
evolution of the populations of ﬁrms that allows small random effects to inﬂuence 
ﬁrms’ survival rates. Following Foster and Young (1990), we now assume that the 
evolution of the share of domestic ﬁrms in the i-th industry is well approximated 
by a Wiener process: 
i Tdzi 5 [e 2 z] [(mAz 1 (1 2m)Bz*)dt 1 sG(z)dW]zi 
where G(z) is a 232 matrix continuous in z and satisfying the property that 
z TG(z)5(0, 0), and W is an 231 continuous white-noise process with mean zero 
and unit variance covariance matrix. We have suppressed the dependence of z(t), 
z*(t), and W(t) in this expression for ease of exposition. Likewise, the evolution of 
foreign ﬁrms is governed by: 
i T Tdz* i 5 [e 2 z*] [(mB z  1 (1 2m)A*z*)dt 1s*G *(z*)dW*]z* i 
where all the terms are analogous. We assume that the stochastic processes W(t) 
and W*(t) are independent; in essence, we are imposing that the idiosyncratic 
mutations that affect domestic ﬁrms do not spill across the border. Population 
 distributions on the corners of the state space are absorbing. Thus it is natural 
examine its interior. We ﬁx d .0 and consider the restricted state space Sd5[d, 
12d ]3[d, 12d ]. If the share of type-1 ﬁrms in a country becomes too small, then 
the state d .0 is a reﬂecting barrier; the analogous statement holds for 12d if the 
share becomes too large. 
Fig. 2 shows the simulation for the base case with general matching 17. The 
annual mutation rate is 5%, and the ﬁgure displays 500 years of monthly data. The 
production parameters were chosen so that the home country had comparative 
advantage in the ﬁrst good, the taste parameter was set so that equal shares of 
income would be spent on either good, and the countries had equal populations. 
This ﬁgure is essentially the time series representation of the stochastic version of 
the phase diagram given in Fig. 1. The initial conditions for the world economy 
were set to mimic two closed economies in long-run equilibrium that open for 
trade. 
The qualitative features of this ﬁgure are robust. Although there is a substantial 
variance in the shares of ﬁrms in each sector, the world economy converges 
rapidly to production according to comparative advantage. Shocks in the home 
country that decrease the share of ﬁrms in the natural exporting industry are 
propagated across borders and raise the share of foreign ﬁrms producing according 
to comparative disadvantage. This is made manifest by the negative correlation 
between the time series at the top of the ﬁgure and that on the bottom. There is no 
tendency for the pattern of trade to reverse in the long run because the equilibrium 
with comparative advantage is the basin with minimum potential. We also ran 
many simulations (not shown here) of the model with restricted matching using the 
Fig. 2. General matching, 500 years of monthly data (annual standard deviation of 5%). 
17The production and taste parameters are the same as before. The foreign country has relative size 
L*51, s50.05 is the annual mutation rate, and d50.01 is the reﬂecting barrier. We set G(z) 51/z1 1 /z1
and G *(?)5G(?).F G2 1/z2 2 1/z2 
 same parameters and initial conditions 18. Again, there is rapid convergence to 
production according to comparative advantage. The main difference between this 
case and the general one is that the variance of the shares of ﬁrms between sectors 
is lower because in the model with restricted matching ﬁrms’ decisions are 
strongly reinforcing across national boundaries. 
How quickly will a pattern of trade according to comparative advantage arise? 
We ran repeated simulations of the general matching model starting from a 
situation in which the initial conditions were severely skewed against comparative 
advantage, with only 10% of the home ﬁrms in the ‘‘right’’ sector and 90% of the 
foreign ﬁrms in the ‘‘wrong’’ sector. Thus initial domestic ﬁrms in the natural 
exporting industry faced very severe ‘‘foreign competition,’’ and there was great 
inertia in both countries keeping the pattern of trade in the wrong conﬁguration. 
The median number of years during which domestic ﬁrms in the ﬁrst industry were 
not predominant on the world stage was 54, and the corresponding average was 
76.5. Since mutations can—and occasionally do—cause the ‘‘right’’ trade pattern 
to go awry, these statistics are upper bounds for the typical waiting time for the 
world economy to set itself straight. Thus for these parameter values and extreme 
initial conditions, there was fairly rapid convergence to trade according to 
comparative advantage. 
Fig. 3 shows what can happen if the world economy starts out in an unfavorable 
state and there is restricted matching. Again, the initial conditions are such that 
only 10% of ﬁrms in either country are in the ‘‘right sector’’. Now, it takes four 
centuries for the world economy to reach the equilibrium with comparative 
advantage, but when the change occurs, it is abrupt. Thus, if the initial conditions 
Fig. 3. Restricted matching, 500 years of monthly data (annual standard deviation of 5%). 
18 i T 
˜Of course, we change the Wiener process to dz 5[e 2z] [Bz*dt1sG(z)dW]z with dz* changedi i i 
analogously. These values imply that zˆ1 ¯ 0.31 and zˆ * 1 ¯0.69. 
 in the world economy entail the wrong pattern of specialization, the dynamic path 
of world trade has the ﬂavor of Eldrige and Gould’s (Eldrige and Gould, 1972) 
notion of a ‘‘punctuated equilibrium’’ in a biological system. 
Since the standard deviation of the annual shocks is 5% and the reﬂecting 
barrier is 1%, the share of home ﬁrms in the ﬁrst industry is almost always 
between 1 and 10% in the initial phase of the world economy. Likewise, the share 
of foreign ﬁrms in that industry—the wrong one for them—is most often between 
90 and 99% in this phase. The lower reﬂecting barrier insures that ﬁrms are born 
whenever the ﬁrst sector in the domestic economy is in danger of dying out. Still, 
even if the mutation rate of ﬁrms is 5% per year, the pattern of trade is locked into 
the wrong equilibrium for a long time. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has applied a new technique to one of the oldest questions in 
international economics and has showed that there are very sound evolutionary 
foundations for the notion of comparative advantage. Our model was very simple, 
perhaps unduly so. But the two-good Ricardian model with Mill–Graham 
preferences has an illustrious history in the long progression of the ﬁeld of 
international economics. And for us it has the added advantage that the unique 
evolutionarily stable outcome in the closed economy maximizes expected social 
surplus, given the inefﬁciencies inherent in the matching process. An obvious area 
for future research is to study a model with more general preferences and 
arbitrarily many goods. We conjecture that production according to the chain of 
comparative advantage is in the stochastically stable set for a wide class of 
preferences and matching models. 
There is a vein of literature in international trade on vent-for-surplus models 19. 
Borrowing this term from Williams (1929) and Myint (1958) emphasizes that this 
way of thinking about international trade actually goes back to a key passage in 
the Wealth of Nations (ﬁfth ed., 1789): 
Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them 
derive two distinct beneﬁts from it. It carries out that surplus part of the 
produce of their land and labor for which there is no demand, and brings 
back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a 
value to their superﬂuities . . . .  By  means of it, the narrowness of the home 
market does not hinder the division of labor in any particular branch of art or 
 
19This paragraph was inspired by the comments of an anonymous referee. A seminal paper by Caves 
(1965) helped bring these ideas to an inﬂuential audience of modern trade theorists. 
manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection . . . (Vol. I, Cannan 
ed., p. 413) 20. 
Myint’s analysis is based on this insight, and his work can be seen broadly as a 
way of describing the costs and beneﬁts of international trade in situations where 
the traditional model of comparative costs may not be germane. A matching model 
introduces an ineluctable element of distributive inefﬁciency into a model of 
international trade. It is noteworthy that the version of our model with restricted 
matching is able to capture the gains from trade due solely to increased division of 
labor, even when it is not aligned with comparative advantage. In that version, one 
of the evolutionary equilibria entails the ‘‘wrong’’ specialization. Still, both home 
and foreign agents may well be better off with trade because in the closed 
economy specialization is incomplete and half the matches are sterile. By contrast, 
international trade increases the division of labor in the world economy, and 
eliminates these sterile matches, thereby leading to potentially higher welfare. That 
is, trade enhances economic welfare by increasing the division of labor and 
enabling countries to overcome technical indivisibilities in production through a 
larger market size. 
Our model is a detailed analysis of trade between countries facing severe trading 
frictions, and the strength of our conclusions probably lies in the fact that 
comparative advantage predicts trade even in this distorted economy. Perhaps our 
most important insight is that trade according to comparative advantage has a kind 
of stability that has never been known before. Why, exactly, is that kind of trade 
evolutionarily stable? We conjecture that comparative advantage is such a deep 
property of models of productive activity that it survives many market imperfec­
tions. Thus any oligopoly model that predicts trade against the pattern of 
comparative advantage must have made very severe and likely fragile assumptions 
about production or market structure. Evolutionary models are of course a very 
simple kind of imperfect competition, and we hope our work spurs further research 
in trade theory in this promising area. 
What are some compelling extensions of our analysis? Studying a model with 
several countries poses a more daunting technical challenge for the applied 
theorist. The exact predictions of any such model will depend upon how one 
divides the gains from trade when several ﬁrms meet. Likewise, the dynamics of 
the world economy will be determined by the interaction between several 
populations of ﬁrms. Perhaps production according to comparative advantage will 
still occur, although it is also likely that the dynamics of the pattern of trade will 
be very complicated indeed. This is an open area of research for international 
economics or applied game theory. 
20The entire text of Cannan’s version (1904) of the ﬁfth edition of the Wealth of Nations (1789) can 
be found at http: / /www.econlib.org / library /Smith /smWN.html. 
  
 
 Our work shows how important the exact structure of the matching process is 
for a model of international trade. In the general matching model, production to 
according to comparative advantage arose in a model in which we had to make 
none of the many assumptions inherent in the usual neo-classical framework. In 
particular, there was no assumption about rational behavior, proﬁt maximization, 
or common knowledge. Although our general matching model with random 
mutations showed a fairly wide variance in the distribution of ﬁrms between 
sectors in a plausible simulation, convergence to comparative advantage following 
trade liberalization was fairly rapid. In the model with restricted matching, 
production according to comparative disadvantage could occur, although this 
pattern was not in the stochastically stable set. These results stress the importance 
of stimulating domestic trade simultaneously with international trade liberalization 
in order to ensure specialization according to comparative advantage. The central 
implication of this work is that a general model of matching or random mutations 
in a restricted model of matching helps guarantee production according to 
comparative advantage, even in a model with myopic agents and trading frictions. 
We take this as a strong vindication of the insights of Ricardo. 
8. Uncited references 
Ricardo, 1963; Smith, 1776. 
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Appendix A 
Proposition 4.1. Complete specialization according to comparative disadvantage 
 is not an equilibrium. 
T TProof. Assume to the contrary that s5(z, z*)5((0, 1) , (1, 0) ) is an equilibrium. 
¯The ﬁtness of a domestic ﬁrm is f(r, s)5mu r  1(12m)ur . Since s is a Nash h 1  2  
equilibrium, producing the ﬁrst good cannot yield higher ﬁtness and thus muh # 
Likewise, the ﬁtness of a foreign ﬁrm is f *(r, s)5mur(12m)u¯.	 ¯ 1(12m)u r  .1 f 2 
Since s is a Nash equilibrium, producing the second good cannot yield higher 
ﬁtness and hence mu¯$(12m)u . These two inequalities imply that u u  #u¯ 2. But f	 h f 
0,u u  5uu¯ ¯. Hence u¯ # u¯, contradicting the assumption that u¯ . u¯. hh f  
Proposition 4.2. No Nash equilibrium is such that a country is completely 
specialized in the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage. 
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that the home country is incompletely specialized and s5(z, 
T Tz*)5((z1, z2) , (1, 0) ) is a Nash equilibrium. Since a domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds it 
equally proﬁtable to produce either good, mz u  5mz u  1(12m)u¯ and thus 2 h  1 h  
 m(z 2z )u 5(12m)u¯. Since this is an equilibrium, it must not be the case that a 2 1 h 
foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to produce the second good. Hence, mz u¯$2 
 mz u¯1(12m)u . But this inequality implies that m(z 2z )u¯.(12m)u , where 1 f	 2 1 f 
the strict inequality follows from u¯ . u¯. Dividing this strict inequality by the 
¯ .u /u¯, which is equivalent to uu .u u  . But this is analogous equality yields u /u	 ¯ ¯  h f h f 
¯ ¯a contradiction because uu .u uh f. 
Assume next that the foreign country is incompletely specialized and thus s5(z, 
T T z*)5((0, 1) , (z* *  1 , z2 ) ) is a Nash equilibrium. Since a foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally 
* ¯ *proﬁtable to produce either good, (12m)z u  5mu1(12m)z u  and thus (121 f 2 f 
* *  ¯
 m)(z1 2z2 )uf 5mu. Since this is an equilibrium, a home ﬁrm cannot ﬁnd it more 
proﬁtable to produce the ﬁrst good and thus (12m)z u¯$mu * ¯* 1(12m)z u. This 1 h 2 
weak inequality implies that (12m)(z* *  )u¯.mu , where again we have used 2z1 2 h 
the fact that u¯ . u¯. Thus we may derive u¯ /uf .uh /u¯, again a contradiction of the 
fact that uu¯ ¯5u u  . hh f  
Proposition 4.4. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both countries are 
incompletely specialized. 
Proof. Assume that both countries are incompletely specialized and that s5(z, 
T T
 z*)5((z , z ) , (z* *, z ) ) is an equilibrium. Since a domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally 1 2 1 2 
proﬁtable to produce either good, mz u  * ¯ * ¯1(12m)z u5mz u  1(12m)z u. Like­2 h  2 1 h  1  
wise, a foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally proﬁtable to produce either good and 
mz u¯1(12m)z u  5mz u¯1(12m)z u* . Since z 512z and z 512z**	 * , the ﬁrst 2 2 f 1 1 f 2 1 2 1 
equality implies m(1 2 2z )u 5 (1 2m)(z*(u¯ 1u) 2 u¯ ) and the second implies 1 h 1 ]
m(u 2 z (u¯ 1u)) 5 (1 2m)(2z*2 1)u . Solving the ﬁrst equation for z* yields1 1 f	 1] ] 
muh 1 (1 2m)u¯ 2muh
z* 1 5]]]]] 2]]]]] z1.(1 2m)(u¯ 1 u¯ )  (1  2m)(u¯ 1 u¯ ) 
Likewise, solving the second equation for z* 1 yields gives 
mu¯ 1 (1 2m)uf m(u¯ 1 u¯ )
z* 1 5]]]]] 2]]] z1.2(1 2m)uf 2(1 2m)uf 
We will now show in two steps that this system of two equations does not have 
a solution such that 0#z* 1 #1. First, we will show that the intercept of the ﬁrst line 
is strictly greater than that of the second line. Second, we will show that the slope 
of the ﬁrst line is strictly greater than that of the second. We establish the ﬁrst step 
if (mu 1(12m)u¯ ) /(u¯1u¯ ).(mu¯1(12m)u ) /2u . Cross-multiplying yields the h	 f f 
following logically equivalent inequalities 
2u (mu ¯ ¯  ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  ¯1 (1 2m)u ) . (mu 1 (1 2m)u )(u 1 u )⇔2muu 1 2(1 2m)uuf h	 f f 
¯ f ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  ¯  f. (mu 1 (1 2m)u )(u 1 u )⇔2muu 1 2(1 2m)uu 
¯ ¯  ¯  
2
f ¯ ¯ f ¯ ¯  .muu 1m(u ) 1 (1 2m)u u  1 (1 2m)uu ⇔muu 
1 (1 2m)uu¯ f ¯ 2 ¯ f ¯ ¯  ¯  2 .m(u ) 1 (1 2m)uu ⇔m(uu 2 (u ) )  
. (1 2m)(u¯2 u¯ )uf⇔mu(u 2 u¯ )¯ ¯  
. (1 2m)(u¯2 u¯ )uf⇔mu¯ . 2  (1 2m)uf 
where we have again used the fact that u u  ¯ ¯  f h  5uu. We now establish the second 
step. We must show that 2(2muh) /(12m)(u¯1u¯ ).2(m(u¯1u¯ )) /2(12m)uf. This 
inequality is logically equivalent to this chain: 
2mu m(u¯ 1 u¯ )h	 2 2]]]]] ,]]]⇔4u u  ¯ ¯  ¯ ¯  ¯ ¯  h f  , (u 1 u ) ⇔4uu , (u 1 u ) ⇔0(1 2m)(u¯ 1 u¯ )  2(1  2m)uf 
, (u¯2 u¯ )2 
¯ ¯where we have again used that u u  5uu. hf h  
Proposition 4.5. The pattern of production according to comparative advantage is 
evolutionarily stable. 
Proof. Since this is a game with two players each having ﬁnitely many pure 
strategies, it has an equilibrium. Proposition 4.4 shows that the equilibrium cannot 
have both players mixing simultaneously. Also, Proposition 4.2 implies that a 
country is completely specialized only if it is producing according to comparative 
advantage. 
Consider ﬁrst a Nash equilibrium in which the home ﬁrms are completely 
T T
specialized and thus s5(z, z*)5((1, 0) , (z* *  1 , z2 ) ). Since domestic ﬁrms produce 
only the ﬁrst good, (12m)z u¯$mu ¯ *. Let ´.0 be sufﬁciently small, * 1(12m)uz2 h 1 
and consider a mutation by a share ´ of domestic ﬁrms where these ﬁrms produce 
only the second good. The ﬁtness of the (domestic) mutants is f(r, s )5m(12 
* ¯ 
´ 
´)u 1(12m)z u, and the ﬁtness of the rest of the domestic ﬁrms is f(z,h 1 
s )5m´u * ¯1(12m)z u. Since ´.0, the weak inequality implies that f(r, s ),f(z,´ h 2 ´ 
s ) and thus specializing in the ﬁrst good is evolutionarily stable. ´ 
Consider next a Nash equilibrium in which the domestic ﬁrms are incompletely 
specialized and the foreign ﬁrms are completely specialized. Now s5(z, z*)5((z1, 
T Tz2) , (0, 1) ). Since domestic ﬁrms are indifferent between producing either good, 
mz u  1(12m)u¯5mz u  . Again, consider a mutation by a sufﬁciently small share 2 h  1 h  
´.0 of domestic ﬁrms that produce only the ﬁrst good. (Producing the second 
good will obviously lower the mutants’ ﬁtness since they give up all matches 
according to comparative advantage with foreign ﬁrms.) The ﬁtness of the 
domestic mutants is f(r, s )5mz (12´)u 1(12m)u¯, and the ﬁtness of the rest of ´ 2 h 
the population of domestic ﬁrms is f(z, s )5z [mz (12´)u 1(12m)u¯ ]1´ 1 2 h 
z m[z (12´)1´]u . Hence, the difference f(z, s )2f(r, s )5(z 21)[mz (122 1 h ´ ´ 1 2 
´)u 1(12m)u¯ ]1z m[z (12´)1´]uh 2 1 h 
5 (z 2 1)[mz u  1 (1 2m)u¯2 ´ mz u  ] 1 z m[z (1 2´) 1´]u1 2 h 2 h 2 1 h 
5 (z 2 1)[mz u  2 ´ mz u  ] 1 (1 2 z )m[z 1´(1 2 z )]u1 1 h 2 h 1 1 1 h 
(using mz u  1(12m)u¯5mz u  and z 512z )2 h  1 h 2 1  
5mu (z 2 1)[z 2´z ] 1 (1 2 z )m[z 1´(1 2 z )]uh 1 1 2 1 1 1 h 
5mu (z 2 1)[(1 1´)z 2´2 z 2´(1 2 z )]h 1 1 1 1 
(using z2 512z1 and factoring common terms) 
5 2muh ´ (z1 2 1)2 . 0. 
Since the labels ‘‘home ﬁrm’’ and ‘‘good 1’’ were arbitrary, it is obvious that these 
arguments generalize to the relevant cases for the foreign ﬁrm. h 
Proposition 5.1. Impose Assumptions 4 and 5. Then there are two evolutionarily 
stable strategies, one with production according to comparative advantage and 
another with production according to comparative disadvantage. 
T T T TProof. There are three Nash equilibria: ((1, 0) , (0, 1) ), ((0, 1) , (1, 0) ), and 
T T 
˜  ˜ ˜  ˜ ˜  sˆ5 ((zˆ ˆ  , z ) , (zˆ  ˆ  * *, z ) ), where zˆ 5 u˜ ˜  ˜  /(u 1 u ), zˆ 5 u˜ ˜  ˜  /(u 1 u ), zˆ *5 u˜ ˜  ˜  /(u 1 u ),1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
˜and zˆ 2 ˜ ˜  ˜  The ﬁrst two are strict Nash equilibria and thus are*5 u /(u 1 u ). 
evolutionarily stable strategies for this game with a bimorphic population. 
Now consider the (mixed strategy) equilibrium sˆ. Since domestic ﬁrms never 
meet each other, a small share can deviate and produce the ﬁrst good without 
lowering their average ﬁtness as compared with the rest of the population of 
domestic ﬁrms. So this equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable. h 
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